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Brian N. Zeiler-Kligman*

How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love the GATS: An Examination of
the Impact of the General Agreement
on Trade in Services on the Canadian
Health-Care System

There is perhaps no more cherished Canadian institution than our universal
health-care system, Medicare. Despite Canadians' fondness for Medicare,
there are often allegations that various external elements threaten Medicare's
viability. One of these oft-cited elements is the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS), which some have claimed will force the privatization of all public
services. The truth in such claims is tested by examining the effect the GATS is
likely to have on the Canadian health-care system. The examination includes an
interpretation of GATS Article 1.3 through a textual analysis. GATS' impact on this
system is explored on three levels: the ability to regulate, the ability to insure/fund
publicly and the ability to provide publicly. From this analysis, it is shown that the
GATS poses little threat to the continued public nature of Medicare: governments
can still regulate who can provide health services and their quality; governments
can still fund whichever medical services they wish; whether or not governments
publicly provide health services is only slightly affected by the GATS and really
has no impact on the public nature of Medicare.
II ny a sans doute pas d'institution canadienne que nous ch~rissons plus que
notre regime universel d'assurance maladie. Malgr6 I'affection que les Canadiens
portent , leur r6gime assurance maladie, on entend souvent des all6gations que
divers elments externes menacent la viabilit6 du r~gime d'assurance maladie.
L'un de ces elements souvent cites est I'Accord g~neral sur le commerce des
services (AGCS), dont certains pretendent qu'il va forcer la privatisation de tous
les services publics. Le bien-fond des d~clarations de ce genre est mis 6 rude
6preuve par I'examen des effets que IAGCS est susceptible d'avoir sur le r~gime
canadien d'assurance maladie. Lexamen comporte une interpretation de Iarticle
1.3 de IAGCS par une analyse textuelle. L'effet de IAGCS sur le regime est 6tudi6
sur trois niveaux: la capacit6 de r~glementer, la capacite d'assurer ou de financer
publiquement et la capacit6 d'offrirpubliquement. A partir de cette analyse, il est
d~montr6 que IAGCS ne menace pas la nature publique du r~gime assurance
maladie : les gouvernements peuvent r~glementer pour determiner qui peut offrir
des services de santd et la qualit6 de ces services; les gouvernements peuvent
financer les services m~dicaux qu'ils jugent bon de financer; la capacit6 pour les
gouvernements doffrir publiquement des services de sante n'est que legerement
affect~e par I'AGCS qui, a toutes fins utiles, n'a pas dincidence sur le caractere
public du regime d'assurance maladie.
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How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the GATS
Canadians are known as a polite and dispassionate people. That is,
until something threatens the vitality and sanctity of our public, universal
health-care system ("Medicare"). In this light, it is not surprising that
the system should be called "one of Canada's finest achievements and a
powerful symbol of national identity"' or that Canadians take pride in our
public health-care system, seeing it as a reflection of national values that
distinguishes us from Americans.' In the last few years, at least, health
care has also tended to be among the biggest election issues, 3 as reflected
in the federal government's statement that "no issue touches Canadians
4
more deeply than health care" in a recent speech from the throne.
Despite Canadians' attachment to Medicare, we also appear to be
convinced that this public system is in continual peril. Worries of "twotier" health-care systems abound should the private sector appear to play
too large a role, with no politician wanting to be seen as advocating the
growth of a private sector role in health care. For instance, in the prelude
to the 2004 election campaign, then Health Minister Pierre Pettigrew
said that the federal government would not object if private companies
played a larger role in health-care delivery. However, the fallout from this
comment was so severe that the Minister was forced to retract it just one
day later.'
One of the more prevalent concerns voiced about perceived threats
to the continued public nature of Canada's Medicare system is the impact
that various international trade agreements could have on it. Indeed, this
issue is seen as so important that one of the eleven chapters in the Final
Report of the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada was
devoted to "Health Care and Globalization," with a substantial portion of
this chapter exploring the impact that international trade agreements might
have on Medicare. 6 One of the oft-cited culprits is the General Agreement
1. Canadian federal government lawyers quoted in CBC News, "Top Court Strikes Down Quebec
Private Health-Care Ban" CBC News.ca (9 June 2005), online: CBC News <www.cbc.ca/story/
canada/national/2005/06/09/newscoc-health050609.html>.
2.
"Private Concerns" The Economist 375:8431 (18 June 2005) 51 at 51.
3.
Fistfuls of Health Dollars" The Economist 371:8378 (5 June 2004) 45 at 45. For example, in the
election in 2004, all 3 major national parties (the Liberals, NDP and Conservatives) agreed that a large
cash infusion to the Medicare system was how to improve it, with the size of the infusion being one
of the main sources of difference. See also Communications Canada, "Spring 2002 survey results,"
online: Communications Canada <www.communication.gc.ca/survey_ sondage/12/cs spring2002_
05.html> (date accessed: 28 March 2004).
Governor-General of Canada, Speech from the Throne to Open the Thirty-Seventh Parliament of
4.
Canada (2003), online: The Privy Council Office <http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/about/process/
info/throne/index.asp?Language=E&param=sp&parl=37&sess=2>.
5.
Fistfuls of Health Dollars, supra note 3 at 45.
Canada, Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, Building on Values: The Future
6.
of Health Care in Canada- Final Report (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 2002) at 23 3-246 [Romanow
Report].
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on Trade in Services7 , which is administered through the auspices of the
World Trade Organization. 8 Even though GATS Article 1.3(b) explicitly
excludes "services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority"
from GATS' scope (which is defined in GATS Article 1.3(c) as services
that are not provided on a commercial basis or in competition with one
or more service suppliers), some commentators express the belief that the
GATS seeks out, and will eventually lead to, the privatization of all public
9
services.
So, in spite of the clear domestic desire to not only keep Medicare
in place, but to strengthen and expand it, claims persist that the GATS, a
multilateral agreement, will force Medicare's dissolution and privatization.
In its current incarnation, Medicare is delivered by a combination of public
and private agents, but the populace's access to health services is ensured
on an egalitarian basis. Underlying the claims that the GATS will result
in the privatization of health services is a fear that the increased private
provision of public services will upset the distributional balance of access
to health care since Medicare is distributed on a needs basis, but markets
distribute services on an ability-to-pay basis. Exploring the conclusions
drawn from such claims, though, reveals a misunderstanding of the force
of GATS' provisions and of the elements that comprise these public
services. In fact, there is an assumption that increased private provision
of any public service necessarily means less government involvement and
less equality in access to the service.
In this article, I seek to answer whether GATS' provisions pose a
threat to the continued public nature of, and government involvement in,
the Canadian health-care system and further, whether GATS' provisions
will have any impact on Medicare or its constituent elements.
The liberalization of Medicare, as for all services sectors, will occur
in two instances. The first would be if the Canadian government chose,
of its own accord and without coercion, to open Medicare to market
forces. In such an instance, the GATS will not be the reason for this
action; rather it will be caused by the government in question. Here, the

7.
General Agreement on Trade in Services, 15 April 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. NG7
[GATS].
8.
See, for example, S. Sinclair, GATS: How the World Trade Organization's New "Services"
Negotiations Threaten Democracy (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2000); S.
Sinclair & J. Grieshaber-Otto, Facing the Facts: A Guide to the GATS Debate (Ottawa: Canadian
Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2002); M. Sanger, Reckless Abandon: Canada, the GATS and the Future
of Health-Care (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2001); A.S. Ostry, "International
Trade Regulation and Publicly Funded Health Care in Canada" (2001) 31 Int. J. Health Serv. 475;
and S. Shrybman, The World Trade Organization: A Citizen's Guide (Toronto: Lorimer and Canadian
Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2001).
9.
See, for example, Sinclair, ibid.
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GATS will simply serve as a vehicle to facilitate and enshrine this chosen
liberalization (assuming that the government in question also chooses to
list this liberalization in its GATS schedule).
The other instance would be if a WTO Member accused Canada of
not fulfilling its GAYS commitments and took this matter before a WTO
Panel. If the Panel were to find the complaint to have merit, it would
recommend that Canada bring its provisions into conformity with its
WTO commitments. Were Canada not to make such changes, the WTO's
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) could authorize other WTO Members
to withdraw negotiated benefits equivalent to those deemed to have been
nullified or impaired by the measures found to be inconsistent with GATS
provisions. In this instance, Canada's GATS commitments, as interpreted
and applied by the WTO Panel, would be causing the liberalization of the
health system in question. However, such a scenario is only possible if
Medicare is subject to the GATS and thus not excluded by virtue of GATS
Article 1.3.
Accordingly, this paper will explore the likely outcome should a
dispute that raises the scope of GATS Article 1.3(b) and (c) be heard and
will approach the matter in the same manner as a WTO arbiter would-by
conducting a textual interpretation of the provisions in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law as enshrined
in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties."°
Further, there are three levels to Canada's public health-care system: 1)
governmental regulation and/or standard-setting; 2) public/governmental
financing/insuring of these health services; and 3) public/governmental
provision of these services. Claims that the GATS will result in the
liberalization or privatization of health care assert that government's role
in each of these levels will be undermined, if not eliminated. Accordingly,
the analysis of GATS' impact on Medicare herein explores these three
levels.
The article is set out in three sections. The first section will provide
an overview of the obligations contained in the GATS and the healthrelated commitments found in Canada's schedule. The second section
will be devoted to the likely meaning a WTO Panel will attribute to GATS
Article 1.3. In the final section, these findings will be applied to the overall
structure of Medicare to see what ultimate effect the GATS is likely to
have on this national health-care system. This exercise will show that,
given the likely interpretation to be given to GATS Article 1.3(b) and (c)

10.

Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [ Vienna Convention]; Canada is a signatory.
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by a WTO Panel, there is no threat to the public administration, financing
or regulation of the health-care system in Canada.
I.

The treaty and the commitments done. an overview of the GATS
and Canada' commitments pertainingto health-careservices
The GATS is more appropriately seen as an amalgam of documents
composed of three parts: the preamble and text comprising Annex lB of
the final results of the Uruguay Round"; the sectoral annexes (in such
areas as financial services and maritime transport) that have been agreed
to subsequent to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round; and the national
schedules of specific commitments" submitted by Member governments.
The following discussion focuses on the text of GATS 1994 and Canada's
national schedule.
Article I of the GATS establishes the scope of the agreement.
Specifically, the GATS applies to all measures 3 by Members 14 "affecting
trade in services," although no definition of a service is given anywhere in
the agreement. Trade in services is defined in Article 1.2 as the supply of a
service in any one of four modes: cross-border trade (mode 1); consumption
abroad (mode 2); commercial presence (mode 3); or temporary presence of
natural persons (mode 4). GATS Article 1.3(a) specifies that the agreement
applies to all levels of government within a Member country (provincial,
territorial, local, etc.), as well as any non-governmental bodies that are
exercising powers delegated from these levels of government.
Despite this extensive scope, certain services are excluded from the
terms of the GATS. The services governed by the GATS are defined to
exclude "services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority"
(the Governmental Authority Exclusion) in GATS Article 1.3(b). This
phrase is defined in Article 1.3(c) to mean "any service, which is supplied
neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more service
suppliers."
In order to understand how the GATS and Canada's commitments
could affect health-care services in Canada, it is necessary to define what
services make up a health-care system. For the purposes of this article,
the definition offered by Deber 5 is adopted. She defines a health-care

11. 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994).
12. According to the WTO's website, as of July 7, 2005, all 148 Members had submitted a schedule
of commitments to the WTO, <www.wto.org/english/tratop e/serv e/serv commitments e.htm>.
13. GATS Article XXVIII(a) defines measures to mean "any measure by a Member, whether in the
form of a law, regulation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative action, or any other form."
14. "Member" refers to a WTO Member state.
15. R.B. Deber, DeliveringHealth CareServices: Public,Not-For-ProfitorPrivateDiscussionPaper
No. 17, (Ottawa: Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, 2002) at 8, online: Commission
on the Future of Health <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/care/romanow/ hcc0494.html>.
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system to include: acute hospital care; chronic hospital care; ambulatory
outpatient care (including physician's services); laboratories and radiology;
ancillary benefits (such as dental, vision, physiotherapy, chiropractics and
podiatry); ambulance and transportation; nursing homes and homes for
the aged; home care; rehabilitation care; drugs; assistive devices; mental
health and public health/health promotion; education and training of health
professionals; and planning, research and management.
Having established the scope of services to which the GATS applies
and those services which are defined to make up Canada's health-care
system, we will explore the obligations GATS imposes. For those services
subject to the GATS, there is both a universal framework of obligations
that applies to all services and a set of specific commitments regarding the
treatment of particular service activities listed by each WTO Member in its
national schedule of commitments.
1. Universal obligations
The GATS' universal obligations are found in Part II of the agreement.
As pertains to the subject of this article, only Articles II (Most-Favoured
Nation), VII (Recognition), VIII (Monopolies and Exclusive Service
Suppliers), and the application of dispute settlement provisions to the
GATS are likely to be of importance.
a. Most-favoured nation (MFN)
GATS Article II contains the MFN requirement, stipulating that
governments extend "immediately and unconditionally to services and
service suppliers of any other Member" treatment that is no less favourable
than that which it accords to like services and service suppliers from any
other country. The WTO Appellate Body jurisprudence has clarified that
measures cannot contain dejure or defacto discrimination, even where the
16
measures are neutral on their face.
The GATS' MFN obligation is more lenient than the obligation found
in the GATT because GATS Article II is circumscribed in two ways: 1) by
GATS Article V, that allows Members to enter into bilateral or regional
agreements to liberalize trade in services (similar to Article XXIV of
GATT 1947); and 2) by one-time GATS Article II exemptions (that are, in
principle, to last ten years) that must be listed in the Member's schedule.

16.

European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas

(Complaintby Ecuadoret al.) (1997), WTO Doc. WTIDS27/AB/R at 231, 233 & 234 (Appellate Body
Report), online: WTO <www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/dispustatuse.htm#1996> [Bananas
Case].
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b. Recognition
Any Member that chooses to recognize qualifications obtained in another
country as fulfilling that Member's national standards for the licensing
or certification of service suppliers, whether through a formal agreement
or unilateral declaration, must provide adequate opportunity for other
Members to negotiate similar recognition (Article VII). Any recognition
granted must not be accorded in a discriminatory manner, or operate as a
disguised restriction on trade and all recognition measures must be notified
to the Council for Trade in Services.
c. Monopolies and exclusive service suppliers
GATS Article VIII requires that any monopoly or exclusive service supplier
observe the MFN requirement and not act in a manner inconsistent with
scheduled commitments. Monopolies and exclusive service suppliers
competing in the supply of a service that is outside the scope of their
monopolist's or exclusive service supplier's monopoly rights and is listed
in the Member's schedule of commitments must not abuse their monopoly
position, for example by subsidizing their activities in the competitive
market from monopoly profits.
The decision in Mexico - Measures Affecting Telecommunications
Services'7 may clarify what constitutes an anti-competitive practice. The
Panel stated that the focus of anti-competitive practices is on a major
supplier's "monopolization or the abuse of a dominant position in ways
that affect prices or supply."' 8 While the Panel did not set out an exhaustive
list of what constitutes an anti-competitive practice, it asserted that, at the
very least, anti-competitive cross-subsidization, misuse of competitor
information, withholding ofrelevant technical and commercial information
and horizontal practices related to price-fixing and market-sharing
agreements fall within the meaning of this term. 19 This conclusion was
reached by reference to the provisions of the reference paper in question, 0
Members' competition legislation,' international instruments addressing
competition policy22 and the object and purpose of the Reference Paper
commitments made by Members.23 Further, the Panel found that practices
required under a Member's laws can still be anti-competitive practices.2 4

17. (Complaint by the UnitedStates) (2004), WTO Doc. WT/DS204/R (Panel Report), online: WTO
<www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu-e/dispu-status e.htm#2000> [Mexican Telecoms Case].
18. Ibid. at para. 7.234.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Ibid. at para. 7.238.
Ibid. at para. 7.231.
Ibid. at para. 7.235.
Ibid. at para. 7.236.
Ibid. atpara. 7.237.
Ibid. at para. 7.245.
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d. Dispute settlement
The GATS is subject to the WTO's dispute settlement procedures under
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).25 However, there are some
provisions specific to disputes concerning the GATS. For example, panels
dealing with complaints concerning trade in services should be composed
of well-qualified governmental or non-governmental individuals who
have experience in trade in services and, in particular, sector-specific
expertise.16 As well, for complaints concerning trade in services, the DSB
must only permit the removal of concessions where it thinks the breach is
sufficiently serious.
2. Sector-specific obligations
Members are only bound by the sector-specific obligations of national
treatment and market access, discussed below, to the extent that they
choose, as recorded in that Member's schedule of national commitments.
Canada's schedule lists commitments according to service sector,
following the Services Sectoral Classification List,27 which is based on
the United Nations' Central Product Classification. 28 While the CPC is
comprehensive, there remain tricky concepts, such as culture or health
care, which are not easily pigeon-holed into a single category and may
spread across a number of sectors. Members can also make what is
called a horizontal commitment, which is a commitment that pertains to a
particular mode of supply for all service sectors, regardless of whether or
not any other commitments are listed for a given sector. An example of
Canada's GATS schedule is set out below:

25. Annex 2 to the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994).
26. "Decision on Certain Dispute Settlement Procedures for the General Agreement on Trade in
Services" in The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts
(Geneva: GATT Secretariat, 1994) 457.
27. GATT Secretariat, Services Sectoral Classification List: Note by the Secretariat,GATT Doc.
MTN.GNS/W/120 (1991) [Services Sectoral Classification List].
28. United Nations, StatisticalPaper Series M No. 77, ProvisionalCentral Product Classification
(New York: Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office of the United
Nations, 1991) [CPC].
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As can be seen, each Member's schedule of commitments is set out in
four columns. These columns list, by mode of supply, from left to right:
1) the specific service sector (in most cases, the schedule is more specific
in that particular activities within that sector are mentioned); 2) limitations
on market access; 3) limitations on national treatment; 4) any additional
commitments. Under the two limitations columns entries can express one
of three things: 1) 'none,' which means that the Member has placed no
limitations on either market access or national treatment (depending in
which column it appears) and that service/activity is subject to the full
extent of the GATS measure; 2) "unbound," which means that the Member
has placed absolutely no commitments as to market access or national
treatment on that service/activity and is not bound in any manner by that
GATS measure (this entry has also been used to indicate the technical
unfeasibility of a certain mode of service supply); 3) an entry can describe
in detail those measures that are otherwise inconsistent with market access
or national treatment, but the government has chosen to protect from that
GATS measure.
So, listing a service activity in its schedule commits a Member to accord
greater liberalizing obligations to that service activity, but subject to any
limitation recorded in the schedule itself Members are free to introduce
new measures: 1) for any service activity that is not listed in its schedule;
2) for any listed service activity with respect to which no obligations
are being accepted because the schedule describes the commitment as
"unbound" for a particular mode of delivery; or 3) in accordance with any
express limitations.
While, under the GATS, each Member must submit a schedule
of commitments, the agreement creates no legal obligation to make
commitments, nor does it prescribe the sectoral scope or the depth of
the commitments to be made. By allowing Members to choose which
sectors to liberalize and to what extent, the GATS in principle imposes no
constraints on a government's ability to employ regulatory measures, such
as licensing or qualification requirements or internal standards, for quality
and similar reasons.
GATS Article XXI allows Members to withdraw a concession in its
national schedule anytime on three months' notice. Any Member that
feels that such a withdrawal may affect the benefits it receives under the
GATS may request consultations with the Member modifying its schedule
with a view to negotiating compensation. Compensatory adjustments are
only required if specifically requested by another Member, but must be
extended to all Members on an MFN basis.
The GATS' architecture thus allows Members a great deal of flexibility
and authority to choose how extensive their country's coverage will be,
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making it less stringent than its goods counterpart, the GATT. The end
result is that the GATS has different effects on different Members. There
are commitments that are universal (such as MFN, which applies to all
applicable services) and other commitments that are Member-specific (as
a result of a Member choosing to make a commitment in a specific sector
as described in its schedule of specific commitments).
These Member-specific commitments pertain to market access and
national treatment. GATS Article XVI concerns market access, ensuring
that Members do not impose restrictions on: 1) the number of service
suppliers; 2) the value of service transactions or assets; 3) the total number
of service operations or the total quantity of service output; 4) the total
number of natural persons that can be employed in a particular sector;
or impose limitations on 5) types of legal entities; and 6) foreign equity
participation. GATS Article XVII deals with national treatment, a principle
whereby a Member must treat foreign service suppliers no less favourably
than national service suppliers "in respect of all measures affecting the
supply of services." Formally identical treatment is not needed to satisfy
the national treatment obligations; GATS Article XVII.3 establishes that
the real test of national treatment is equality in conditions of competition,
thus prohibiting both dejure and defacto discrimination.
Listed service activities are also subject to two further disciplines.
The first is enhanced transparency obligations, as set out in GATS Article
III. The other concerns domestic regulation, which is contained in GATS
Article VI.2 9
3. Canadas GATS commitments pertainingto health-careservices
Canada purports to safeguard its health services through what some officials
have called a "belt and suspenders" approach.30 First, Canada relies on the
protection of the Governmental Authority Exclusion expressed in GATS
Article 1.3(b). Second, in case any services are left subject to the GATS,
Canada has bypassed the more stringent market access and national

29. GATS Article VI deals with domestic regulation and is one of the universal obligations found in
the GATS. In general, Article VI commits Members to ensure that, where a Member has undertaken a
specific commitment, all measures of general application affecting trade in services are administered
in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner. In particular, Article VI.4--which applies to any
sectoral commitments in a Member's schedule-establishes that measures relating to qualification
requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do not constitute
unnecessary barriers to trade. This paragraph further directs the Council for Trade in Services to
establish any necessary disciplines in this respect. Clarification and interpretation of Article VI.4 is
a controversial area that forms a main focus of the GATS negotiations that are ongoing as part of the
Doha Round negotiations.
30. J.A. VanDuzer, "Health, Education and Social Services in Canada: The Impact of the GATS" in
J.M. Curtis & D. Ciuriak, eds., Trade Policy Research 2004 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and
Government Services Canada, 2004) 287 at 293ff.
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treatment obligations by not listing health services in its national schedule
of commitments. In its public pronouncements, the Canadian federal
government has also consistently assured Canadians that the delivery of
health services is not threatened by Canada's existing commitments under
GATS.3 1 In March 2001, the Canadian government strengthened its stance
on this issue by declaring that, in the ongoing GATS 2000 negotiations,
it would make no offers on Canada's public health, education, social
services or culture, nor would it seek further openings in these areas in the
negotiations.32
Consequently, Canada does not have many specific commitments
to speak of pertaining to health care. Canada has made commitments
with respect to certain services consumed by the health-care system (for
example building maintenance and computer consulting, maintenance
and data processing).33 Some GATS critics, notably Matthew Sanger,
feel Canada's commitments in these areas will force the privatization of
these services that are utilized by the health-care system, gradually leading
to the erosion of the public nature of Canada's Medicare system. 3 4 This
position, which reflects a lack of understanding of how both the GATS and
Medicare operate, is not supported by the vast majority of commentators.
Accordingly, this viewpoint seems implausible in the extreme.
Amongst the core health-care services defined above, one of Canada's
commitments-that regarding health insurance-has raised some alarm.
While this commitment pertains to private health insurance, as provided by
private sector companies for certain health services, some have expressed
concern that the commitment will extend to public health insurance.35 The
merits of this claim will be examined later in the article.
The elements of Canada's schedule that likely play the largest role in
Canada's commitments on health care are the two horizontal limitations
that pertain in some way to health care. The first limitation states that

31.
Pierre Pettigrew, former Minister for International Trade, repeatedly expressed this (see, for
example, Transparency is a Key Element in the Success of Trade Negotiations, What the Minister
Said (2002), online: DFAIT <http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?FileSpec

=/Min PubDocs/105386.htm>. Similarly, this pledge can be found in descriptions of Canada's
obligations on various government web sites (see, for example, FAQ on the GATS, Public Services,
Health and Education, online: Industry Canada <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/intemet /instp-pcs.nsf/
vwGeneratedlnterE/h skOO151 e.html>.

32.

See, for example, DFAIT, News Release No. 78 (2002), "Canada Makes Public its Requests

in WTO Services Negotiations" Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (8 July
2002),
online:
DFAIT
<http://wo 1.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?publication_
id=379381 &Language=E>.
33. Canada, Schedule of Specific Commitments (15 April 1994), WTO Doe. GATS/SC/16 and Supp.
1, 2, 3 and 4.
34. Sanger, supra note 8 at 88-90 and 94-95.
35. Ibid. at 76-87.
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measures related to the supply of services required to be offered to the
public generally in the health sector may result in differential treatment
in terms of price. This limitation applies only to national treatment
obligations for modes 3 and 4 (commercial presence of foreign services
suppliers and foreign services suppliers temporarily present in Canada,
respectively). Thus, other WTO Members cannot complain that any such
discrimination regarding the prices charged to its services suppliers in
listed sectors changes the conditions of competition for them in breach of
the national treatment obligation.36
The second limitation pertains to national treatment in mode 3 only and
reads as follows: "the supply ofa service or its subsidization within the public
sector is not in breach of this commitment." Exactly what this limitation is
supposed to mean is unclear. Abroad and expansive interpretation suggests
this provision is intended to permit Canada to adopt new programs solely
supplied by the government to the exclusion of foreign services suppliers
in service sectors in which Canada has made specific commitments.
However, such an interpretation would seriously undermine the value of
Canada's commitments in listed sectors. A more limited interpretation
is that the limitation allows Canada to supply or subsidize the supply of
listed services to public sector entities. However, such an interpretation
seems unnecessary given the Governmental Authority Exclusion and the
fact that the GATS does not apply to government procurement. A number
of interpretations in between the two offered above are also possible, but
none offers a clear meaning for this limitation, ultimately leaving it open
to speculation and conjecture.
II. A mystery wrappedin an enigma: unbundling and defining GATS
Article 1. 3
Interpreting the Governmental Authority Exclusion in GATS Article 1.3(b)
and (c) requires an examination of two distinct tests: 1) the service must not
be supplied on a commercial basis and 2) the service must not be supplied in
competition with one or more service suppliers. Health services satisfying
these two tests will fall within the Governmental Authority Exclusion and
will not be subject to GATS' provisions.
The present investigation will, of necessity, be a textual analysis of the
Governmental Authority Exclusion to define the parameters of the above

36.

VanDuzer, supra note 30 at 321.
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tests37 since the two main sources that would be likely to provide some
guidance - previous WTO jurisprudence and treatment of similar GATT
provisions" - are of no assistance. To date, only a handful of WTO
dispute settlement cases have interpreted the GATS and none have dealt
with the meaning of the Governmental Authority Exclusion. 9 Further,

37. Despite the controversy surrounding this topic, only three academics have made a similar
attempt. From these three academics, there are now four publications: M. Krajewski, Public
Services and the Scope of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (Geneva: Center for
International Environmental Law, 2001) [Krajewski 2001]; M. Krajewski, "Public Services and Trade
Liberalization: Mapping the Legal Framework" (2003) 6 J. Int'l Econ. L. 341 [Krajewski 2003]; D.
Luff, "Regulation of Health Services and International Trade Law" in A. Mattoo and P. Sauv6, eds.,
Domestic Regulation and Service Trade Liberalization (Washington, D.C.: World Bank and Oxford
University Press, 2002) 191; and VanDuzer, supra note 30. Of these, the work by VanDuzer offers
by far the most comprehensive and methodical examination available. There was a further treatment
of this subject by the British Columbia Ministry of Employment and Investment (GATS and Public
Service Systems (Victoria: Queen's Printer, 2001)) [BC GATS Paper], but even the BC government
and ministry have distanced themselves from this work; thus, it is not that authoritative a source.
38. As noted by, for example, F. Weiss, 'Dispute Settlement Under the General Agreement on Trade
in Services', in J. Cameron & K. Campbell, eds., Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organisation
(London: Cameron May, 1998) 148, the treatment of GATS provisions in dispute settlement practice
has largely mirrored the treatment of similar provisions in GATT jurisprudence.
39. As of July 31, 2006, the following disputes have been brought in relation to GATS provisions:
Bananas case, supranote 15; Canada- CertainMeasures Concerning Periodicals(Complaint by the
United States) (1997), WTO Doc. WT/DS3 1/R, WT/DS3 I/AB/R (Panel Report and Appellate Body
Report), online: WTO <www.wto.org/english/tratop/dispu e/dispustatuse.htm#1996> [Canada
- Periodicals];United States - The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Complaint by the
European Communities)(1996), WTO Doc. WT/DS38/6, online: WTO <www.wto.org/english/tratop_
e/dispue/dispustatuse.htm# 1996>; Japan-Measures Affecting DistributionServices (Complaintby
the UnitedStates) (1996), WTO Doc. WT/DS45/Add. 1, online: WTO <www.wto.org/english/tratope/
dispu_e/dispustatuse.htm# 1996>; Belgium - Measures Affecting Commercial Telephone Directory
Services (Complaint by the United States) (1997), WTO Doc. WT/DS80/1, online: WTO <www.
wto.orglenglish/tratope/dispu e/ dispu statuse.htm#1997>; Canada - Measures Affecting Film
DistributionServices (Complaint by the European Communities) (1998), WTO Doc. WT/DSI 17/1,
online: WTO <www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/dispu_status e.htm# 1998>; Canada- Certain
MeasuresAffecting the Automobile Industry (Complaints by Japan and the European Communities)
(2000), WTO Doc. WT/DS139, 142/R, WT/DS 139, 142/AB/R (Panel Report and Appellate Body
Report), online: WTO <www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/dispustatuse.htm#1998> [Canada
- Autopact]; Nicaragua - Measures Affecting Imports From Honduras and Colombia (Complaint
by Honduras) (2000), WTO Doe. WT/DS 201/1, online: WTO <www.wto.org/english/tratope/
dispue/dispu status e.htm#2000>; Mexican Telecoms Case, supra note 16; Turkey - CertainImport
Proceduresfor Fresh Fruit (Complaint by Ecuador) (2002), WTO Doc. WT/DS237/4, online: WTO
<www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu e/ dispustatuse.htm#2001 >; United States - Investigationof
the InternationalTrade Commissionin Softwood Lumberfrom Canada(Complaintby Canada)(2004),
WTO Doe. WT/DS277/R (Panel Report), online: WTO <www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu e/
dispu status e.htm#2003> [US- Softwood]; United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (Complaint by Antigua and Barbuda) (2004), WTO Doe.
WT/DS285/R, WT/DS285/AB/R (Panel Report and Appellate Body Report), online: WTO <www.wto.
org/english/tratope/dispue/dispustatus-e.htm#2003> [US - Cross Border Gambling]. Of these,
only EU - Bananas, Canada - Periodicals,Canada- Autopact, Mexican Telecoms, US - Softwood,
US - Cross Border Gambling and China - Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits (Complaint by
the United States) (2004), WTO Doc. WT/DS309/1, online: WTO <www.wto.org/english/tratope/
dispue/dispu statuse.htm#2004> have resulted in final decisions as of July 26, 2005.
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there is no analogous GATT provision to the Governmental Authority
Exclusion.
In previous decisions, the Appellate Body has determined that the treaty
interpretation rules expressed in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention
are to be used as the basic rules for interpreting WTO instruments because
these rules are seen as a codification of the customary international law
rules of treaty interpretation. 40 As such, the general rule of interpretation
is that provisions are to be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given in their context in light of the object and purpose
(Article 31(1)). However, if it is established that the parties so intended,
a special meaning shall be given to a term (Article 31(4)). There can
only be recourse to supplementary means of interpretation if interpretation
according to Article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure or leads
to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable (Article 32).
The context for the purpose of interpreting the GATS comprises
the text, its preamble and annexes, as well as any agreement relating to
the treaty that was made between all the parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty; and any instrument that was made by one or
more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted
by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. In the case of
the GATS, the treaty in question is the Agreement Establishingthe World
Trade Organization,of which the GATS and all the other WTO agreements
(such as the GATT and TRIPS) form an integral part." Together with
the context, the following are to be taken into account: any subsequent
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or
the application of its provisions; any subsequent practice in the application
of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation; and any relevant rules of international law applicable in
the relations between the parties (Article 31(3)). WTO Panels and the
Appellate Body have applied this approach by attempting to determine

40.

Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Complaint by the European Communities, Canada and

the United States) (1996), WTO Doc. WT/DS8, IO/AB/R at 10ff (Appellate Body Report), online:
WTO <www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/dispu-statuse.htm#1995> [Japan - Alcohol] and
United States - Standardsfor Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline(Complaint by Venezuela)

(1996), WTO Doc. WTIDS2/AB/R at 17 (Appellate Body Report), online: WTO <www.wto.org/
english/tratope/dispue/dispustatus e.htm# 1995>.
41.

United States - Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan

(Complaint by Pakistan) (2001), WTO Doc. WT/DSI92/AB/R (Appellate Body Report), online:
WTO <www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/dispu statuse.htm#2000>.
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the ordinary meaning of the language used at the time that the treaty was
concluded.42
Some commentators have discussed the significance of statements
and documents from the WTO Secretariat, the Chair of the Council on
Trade in Services and other WTO organs. 43 These commentators feel
that such statements shed light on possible meanings for ambiguous
provisions, such as GATS Article 1.3; statements from the WTO Secretariat
and similar organs reflect the operative understanding that Members
have of the agreement or provision in question, according to these
commentators. However, the WTO Secretariat and related organs are not
"parties" to the WTO Agreement 4; consequently, their statements are not
considered subsequent practice in the application of the treaty and they
are not authoritative from the point of view of a WTO dispute settlement
proceeding since none of these statements reflects a subsequent agreement
between the Members regarding the interpretation of the treaty or shows
an intention of all the Members to give a term a special meaning at the
time the GATS was entered into.
Some commentators similarly feel that a 1999 joint statement by45
the European Community, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic
expressing their belief that GATS Article 1.3 is "similar" to Article 55 of
the European Community Treaty (a provision in the treaty establishing
the European Union that creates an exception from some of the
investment provisions of the treaty for "activities which in that State are
connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of official authority")
will be influential in interpreting GATS Article 1.3. Since Article 55 of
the European Community Treaty has been interpreted so narrowly that
the Court has yet to find any activity that falls under the scope of the
article, 46 the Governmental Authority Exclusion will be similarly narrowly
interpreted and thus offer no protection to public services. 47 However,
the utility of this article to the interpretation of GATS Article 1.3 seems
limited since the European Court of Justice has also interpreted "services"
42. One of the identified purposes for this approach is to increase the certainty of WTO rules (M.
Lennard, "Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO Agreements" (2002) 5 J. Int'l Econ. L. 17 at
34-35).
43. See, for example, Sanger, supra note 8 at 81-86 and Sinclair & Grieshaber-Otto, supra note 8 at
17-25.
44. Krajewski 2001, supra note 37 at 15 and VanDuzer, supra note 30 at 373.
45. WTO, Council for Trade in Services, Joint Communication from the European Community,
Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic to the Committee of Regional Trade Agreements, WTO
Doc. WT/REG50/2/Add.3. The communication is referred to by, for example, Krajewski 2001, supra
note 37 at 9; Krajewski 2003, supra note 37 at 363; and Sinclair & Grieshaber-Otto, supra note 8 at
20.
46. Krajewski 2001, supra note 37 at 9 and Krajewski 2003, supra note 37 at 365.
47. See, for example, Sinclair & Grieshaber-Otto, supra note 8 at 20.
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to constitute an economic activity, such that certain public services where
funding comes from the public purse (such as public education and health
care) are not seen as "services" and are automatically excluded from the
scope of the agreement.4 8 Further, it seems highly unlikely that statements
such as these would be used by a dispute panel, given the desire for a
predictable application of GATS Article 1.3-as for all other provisions of
the WTO Agreements.
Against this background, we will analyze the two above-noted tests,
drawing on the previous attempts to define this provision.
1. Commercial basis
The meaning of the term "commercial," as well as the broader meaning of
the phrase "supplied on a commercial basis," must be clarified in order to
understand which services satisfy this element. Classifying what is meant
by "commercial" generally entails recourse to a dictionary definition.
Such definitions suggest that the broad meaning of "commercial" is that
it pertains to commerce or trade-meaning the exchange of goods or
services for money. 49 Thus, going by the broad meaning of "commercial,"
a service would have to be supplied free of charge to qualify.
However, GATS Article 1.3 discusses the supply of services on a
commercial basis. The use of this phrase indicates that not only must the
service be supplied in exchange for money or something of commercial
value (in other words, supplied commercially), the service must also be
supplied on a commercial basis. From a logical perspective, only services
supplied on a for-profit basis (those supplied with a view to a profit) can be
considered services that are supplied on a commercial basis. Indeed, the fact
that most definitions of "commercial" explicitly refer to the profit motive

48. Krajewski 2003, supra note 37 at 362-363 & 367.
49. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 4th ed. s.v. "commercial" as: "l)
of or relating to commerce: a commercial loan, a commercial attachd..3) having profit as a chief
aim: a commercial book, not a scholarly tome." The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (www.
m-w.com) s.v. "commercial": "l)a)2) of or relating to commerce <commercial regulations>...2)a)
viewed with regard to profit <a commercial success>." The Compact Oxford English Dictionarys.v.
"commercial": "1) concerned with or engaged in commerce. 2) making or intended to make a profit."
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supports this contention." Consequently, the mere presence of user fees or
prices does not tend to indicate that services are supplied on a commercial
basis. The user fees or prices will have to be intended to be sufficient to
generate a profit for the services to be supplied on a commercial basis.
Thus, where a service has prices that are fixed by the government, that
service can be supplied on a commercial basis. The same considerations
as when prices are not fixed by the government will help to determine the
basis on which that service is supplied. So, whether a service is supplied
on a commercial basis can be discerned from the operational machinations
of, and the price charged for, the service in question, with much depending
on the intricacies of each case.
The price charged for a service ranges on a continuum from providing
a service for free and charging a market price." VanDuzer finds that, as
a result of the emphasis on the profit motive, exclusively not-for-profit
provision of the service is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for
finding that a service is not supplied on a commercial basis. The not-forprofit aspect may have three elements: 1)no personal benefits are derived by
owners, members or others contributing resources to the services supplier;
2) the mandate of the supplier in supplying the service is not to make
profits, but to serve some other purpose; and 3) the supplier carries on its
activities exclusively with a view to fulfilling this mandate by supplying
52
services at prices that will generate revenues no greater than costs.
In order to give effect to the words "in the exercise of governmental
authority," in addition to this not-for-profit mandate, a significant level
of government involvement in the delivery of the service is necessary.
The use of the phrases "in the exercise of' and "governmental authority"
would seem to include services delivered by government (which refers to

50. Commentators having considered this issue were not unanimous on the meaning of commercial
basis. VanDuzer, supra note 30 at 378, argues that it is implicit that services sold on a commercial
basis must be sold on a for-profit basis, supporting this claim with definitions that explicitly refer to
the profit motive. Krajewski 2001, supra note 37 at 10-12 and Krajewski 2003, supra note 37 at 351,
does not assert a conclusion on this issue, but does explain that the price charged to the consumer must
be profit-motivated. On the other hand, Luff, supra note 37 at 194, contends that "it would be difficult
to argue that the application of a provision in an agreement could vary according to the subjective
view that operators have of the purpose of their operations." While Luff makes a seemingly sensible
argument, recourse to national practices with respect to corporate and commercial law show that not
only can the application of a provision vary according to the view that operators have of the purpose
of their operations, it is also possible to discern this purpose from objective criteria. See, for example,
the Supreme Court of Canada case of Spire FreezersLtd. v. Canada,[2001] I S.C.R. 391.
51. Krajewski 2001,supra note 37 at 11.
52. VanDuzer, supranote 30 at 380-381.
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the entire executive and administrative apparatus of the state regardless of
its level or the subject matter with which it deals) 3 or on its behalf.54
The preparatory work of the GATS confirms that functions not
performed directly by the state should be included. Both the December
1990 draft text prepared for the Brussels Ministerial Meeting55 and the
December 1991 Dunkel Draft 6 contained the words "services supplied
in the exercise of government functions." There is nothing in the
public record to indicate how the language change from "government
functions" to "governmental authority" came about. However, the shift
to "governmental authority" seems to suggest a broader exclusion that
catches services not directly provided by government.57 This change in
language, in addition to the definition of the measures to which the GATS
applies contained in GATS Article 1.3(a)(ii), 5 suggests the inclusion of
conduct that is expressly or implicitly authorized by the constitution, a
statute or some other law to be carried out by a government agency or
even a private party. This can be direct provision or provision by a private
entity that is highly regulated by the state in terms of decision-making, the
manner of service delivery and the budget. 9
As a result of all this, it would appear that both governmental and
non-governmental entities that are highly regulated in particular ways by
the state can offer services on a non-commercial basis in the exercise of
governmental authority. The service would have to be offered on a notfor-profit basis, with any user fees involved being either not related to costs
or only intended to cover some costs. Consequently, a service provided
pursuant to a universal service obligation, funded by government, that
charges either no or minimal user fees that are not intended to cover all

53. D.A. Dukelow, The Dictionary of Canadian Law, 3d ed. (Scarborough: Thomson, 2002) s.v.
"government" [Canadian Law Dictionary]: "government" "in its generic sense - meaning the whole
of the governmental apparatus of the state; the executive and administrative branch"; Blacks Law
Dictionary, 7th ed., s.v. "government" [Blacks]: "government" refers "collectively to the political
organs of the country regardless of the function or level and regardless of the subject matter that they
deal with."
54. VanDuzer, supra note 30 at 385.
55. Krajewski 2001, supra note 37 at 16-17; Krajewski 2003, supra note 37 at 357-358.
56. J.V. Reyna, "Services," in T.P. Stewart, ed., The GATT UruguayRound- A Negotiating History
(1986-1992) (Deventer and Boston: Kluwer, 1993) 2335 at 2335-61, Annex 1.
57. Blacks, supra note 53, defines "government function" as: "A government agency's conduct
that is expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution, statute or other law and that
is carried out for the benefit of the general public" (also termed 'governmental act' or 'governmental
activity'). By changing to "governmental authority," it would seem to include conduct done by nongovernmental agencies given authorization by government to perform these duties.
58. "Measures" include "measures taken by ... non-governmental bodies in the exercise of powers
delegated by central, regional or local governments or authorities."
59. VanDuzer, supra note 30 at 385-386.
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the costs of the service would appear to be a service that is offered on a
non-commercial basis.
2. Not in competition
In order to establish what is meant by the term "in competition with one
or more service suppliers" in the Governmental Authority Exclusion, two
questions arise: 1) what factors must be present for there to be competition;
and 2) competition between whom?
The answer to the former question appears clear. Commentators
considering this issue generally agree that rivalry and substitution are the
relevant competitive factors.60 Substitution, from the consumer's point
of view, is necessary for there to be rivalry.6 Substitution is determined
from the consumer's perspective, while rivalry is determined from the
suppliers' perspective.
Establishing when there is substitutability, and thus rivalry, with
respect to services presents greater difficulties. One method to determine
this would be to consider whether the services are "like services."
Determining if there has been discrimination in the context of national
treatment and MFN obligations turns on whether the foreign services
allegedly discriminated against are "like" the domestic services benefiting
from the alleged discrimination. 62 Previous jurisprudence has indicated

60. Luff, supra note 37 at 195 feels that the sole factor determining competition is the presence of
some financial rivalry-regardless of who is the ultimate payer. On the other hand, Krajewski 2001,
supra note 37 at 12 and Krajewski 2003, supra note 37 at 352-353 finds that service suppliers are only
in competition with one another when one supplier's services are a substitute for another supplier's
services. Meanwhile, VanDuzer, supra note 30 at 389 contends that both rivalry and substitution are
necessary components.
61. VanDuzer, ibid. In competition law, demand substitution is a common method employed by
national authorities to determine the relevant market and assess the level of competition between
two actors. See, for example, Competition Bureau Canada, Merger Enforcement Guidelines (2004)
and European Union, Competition Directorate, Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers
(2004). Demand substitution has also been employed by the WTO dispute settlement body as the
appropriate way to determine the relevant market and thus assess whether there is competition between
two entities (see Mexican Telecoms Case, supra note 17 at paras. 7.149-7.152).
62. This concept is well developed in GATT jurisprudence. As indicated in footnote 37, GATS
jurisprudence has tended to mirror GATTjurisprudence with respect to similar provisions. Accordingly,
it seems highly likely that the interpretation of like services will be similar to the interpretation of like
goods (see also Gaetan Verhoosel, National Treatment and WTO DisputeSettlement: Adjudicatingthe
Boundaries ofRegulatory Autonomy (Oxford: Hart, 2002) at 33-34).
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that the test in such instances is the equality of competitive opportunities
63
for suppliers.
The body of cases, under both GATT and the WTO, examining the
concept of likeness of goods has made clear that, while likeness is to be
examined on a case-by-case basis, four factors will help to determine its
presence:
1) the products' end-uses in a given market;
2) consumers' tastes and habits, which vary from country to country;
3) the properties of the product, including their nature and quality;
and
4) the product's tariff classification. 64
Unfortunately, the GATT Services Sectoral ClassificationList is not nearly
precise enough for a "like" services analysis to be able to consider the
fourth factor. The other three, however, can be translated into comparisons
of services. Consequently, services may be considered to compete with
each other where they have the same end uses, are comparable in their
nature and quality and are considered substitutes by consumers. While
these factors present the parameters within which an arbiter can determine
"likeness," the Appellate Body has noted that there will always be an
unavoidable element of "individual, discretionary judgment" involved;

63. In European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products ContainingAsbestos
(Complaintby Canada)(2001) WT/DS 135/AB/R at paras. 99 and 103 (Appellate Body Report) online:
WTO <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-eldispue/dispustatus-e.htm#2000>. [EU - Asbestos],
the consideration of likeness for the purposes of the national treatment obligation in the GATT was
described as "fundamentally a determination about the nature and the extent of the competitive
relationship between and among products." See also United States - Section 33 7 of the TariffAct of
1930 (Complaint by EC) (1989) L/6439, 36' Supp. B.I.S.D. 345. While it is not readily apparent that
it is proper to import the concept of like services into an interpretation of the notion of competition
in GATS Article 1.3(c), this approach has been adopted by most who have considered the issue. For
example, a background note on health services prepared by the WTO Secretariat suggests that this
is the proper approach to take (WTO, Council for Trade in Services, Health and Social Services:
Background Note by the Secretariat, 1998 (S/C/W/50) at 11). See also J.P. Trachtman, 'Lessons
from the GATS for Existing Rules on Domestic Regulation' in A. Mattoo & P. Sauvd, eds., Domestic
Regulation and Services Trade (2003) 61 and VanDuzer, supra note 30 at 390.
64. These criteria were originally suggested in GATT Secretariat, Report of the Working Party on
Border Tax Adjustments, GATT Doe. L/3464, BISD 18S/97 (1970) at para. 18. Japan-Alcohol, supra
note 40 at 19-21 noted that this approach was followed in almost all adopted GATT panel reports that
considered GATT Article 111.2 following the publication of this report. Following the AB's decision
in EU - Asbestos, ibid., it appears that an even broader approach may now be taken in determining
whether goods are 'like.' This case confirmed the four relevant factors to consider, but noted that the
health risk associated with a product might be relevant in deciding that it is not 'like' a product that
poses lower health risks. Critically, health risks were not seen to be a new factor; rather, such concerns
form part of the assessment of a product's physical properties and consumer preferences (para. 113).
So, a comparison of services for 'likeness' should take into account all aspects in assessing whether
competition is present.
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thus, "it is a discretionary decision that must be made in considering the
various characteristics of products in individual cases. '65 In making this
determination, the nature of the production process, as confirmed in GATS
jurisprudence with regard to the MFN obligation, 66 is not a basis for finding
that the services or the suppliers of the service are not alike.
However, even assuming an assessment of "likeness" can be made,
the unique nature of services adds a further wrinkle that can make such
an evaluation less useful. Services that are not "like" each other-as in
the case of using prescription drugs or surgery to treat the same medical
ailment-may still be in competition with one another. Consequently,
67
substitutability is likely the most telling factor.
As for the latter question of who must be competing, the wording of the
provision would seem to suggest a particular meaning is intended. Whether
private sector suppliers compete for consumers with the governmental
service supplier is not relevant; the governmental service supplier must
operate so as to compete with the private sector providers to fall outside
the Governmental Authority Exclusion (and thus within the scope of the
GATS). Thus, where the government service is provided pursuant to
a universal service obligation on a non-profit basis, there would be no
competition with private suppliers of the same or similar services.6 8
It should be noted it is not axiomatic that this one-way conception
of the meaning of competition will be adopted by a dispute settlement
proceeding. The Governmental Authority Exclusion's language is
sufficiently imprecise to plausibly yield an interpretation of competition
that refers to any situation where private suppliers are competing with
the governmental service supplier. Even so, the text's ordinary meaning
69
would seem to support the one-way interpretation.

65. Japan-Alcohol, supra note 40 at 20-21.
66. Bananas Case, supra note 16. In this instance, the services were differentiated only by the
national origin of the good to which these services were applied.
67. VanDuzer, supranote 30 at 393-394.
68. Ibid. at 394-395. Krajewski 2001, supra note 37 at 12-13 agrees with this formulation, although
not as strongly as VanDuzer. Luff, supranote 37 at 195, asserts that "to the extent services supplied by
the government are not competing with services supplied under certain competitive conditions, they
could be excluded from the scope of GATS." However, he feels this is wrongly phrased and that the
only question to be asked concerning the criterion of competition is whether there is some financial
rivalry among suppliers of the service concerned in the country, no matter how intense the competition
or how imperfect the conditions of competition prevailing for that service.
69. David Hartridge, former head of the Services Branch of the WTO Secretariat, endorsed the
one-way interpretation of the 'not in competition' requirement in a letter to Mike Waghorne of Public
Services International, cited in VanDuzer, supra note 30 at 395ff.
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3. Definitions in thefinancialservices annex
The Annex on Financial Services, being an integral part of the GATS,
provides additional provisions that must be taken into account in the area
of financial services. One of these provisions provides a further meaning
for the Governmental Authority Exclusion. In the context of the Financial
Services Annex, the exclusion is limited to activities undertaken by public
entities and only to the subset of these activities that are for the account
of government or using the financial resources of government. Private
entities exercising powers delegated by the state would seem to be outside
the exclusion, regardless of their means of financing.
Perhaps the most significant part of the Annex on Financial Service's
definition of the Governmental Authority Exclusion (contained in Article
I(b), (c) and (d) of the Annex) is that it nullifies the two requirements in
GATS Article 1.3(c). So long as the activity is undertaken by a public
entity, it does not matter if the services are provided on a commercial
basis or in competition with one or more service suppliers. However, the
Annex's exclusion does not apply where a country permits financial service
suppliers to conduct any otherwise excluded activities in competition
with the public entity. Thus, the Annex's examination of competition is
different than the one found in GATS Article 1.3. In the Annex on Financial
Services, it is irrelevant whether the entity exercising governmental
authority competes; the only issue is whether private service suppliers are
permitted to compete. 0
However, most commentators feel that the direct delivery of health
services cannot be considered to be financial services. In their opinions, the
Annex provides no interpretative assistance with respect to understanding
the scope of the Governmental Authority Exclusion as it pertains to national
health-care systems. 7 As physician and hospital services are clearly not
financial services (indeed, such services are listed in sectors separate from
financial services in the GATT Services Sectoral ClassificationList), the
delivery of such services will not come within the purview of the definitions
found in the Annex on Financial Services. However, the definitions in the
Financial Services Annex could have an impact on the funding of health
services because the Annex applies to all "measures affecting the supply of
financial services. '"72 As will be discussed later, though, this point is moot,
70. VanDuzer, ibid. at 403-404 notes, by reference to the fact that the definition of 'financial services
supplier' found in the Annex excludes public entities, the exclusion will still pertain if other public
sector suppliers were permitted to compete.
71. See, for example, Krajewski 2001, supra note 37 at 13-14; Luff, supra note 37 at 18 and BC
GATS Paper, supra note 37 at 41.
72. VanDuzer, supra note 30 at 401-402.
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as the funding of health services is exempt from GATS' scope regardless
of which meaning for the Governmental Authority Exclusion one uses.
4. Preamble
Many commentators place a great deal of importance in the GATS
preamble. They claim that its explicit recognition of the "right of Members
to regulate, and to introduce new regulations" and the need to give "respect
to national policy objectives"" assures that the adjudicators in a dispute
settlement proceeding will defer to a Member's decision to adopt healthcare measures that advance national policy objectives.74 However, these
commentators seem to overlook the fact that the preamble also calls for
"progressively higher levels of liberalization of trade in services" just
before the aforementioned passages. As such, the effect of the preamble is
essentially ambiguous. Adjudicators attempting to discern the context of
the GATS, by way of reference to its preamble, should give equal weight
to regulations that meet national policy objectives and to measures that
achieve greater liberalization. Further, the preamble is only a part of the
context that serves to clarify how an agreement's substantive provisions
are to be interpreted. The preamble has little intrinsic value and pales in
comparison to the provisions of the agreement itself. As such, it seems
unlikely to have as large an impact as these commentators suggest.
5. Summary
Services delivered in the exercise of governmental authority can be supplied
by both public and private entities, so long as the entity is exercising the
authority of government in supplying the service, meaning that there
is substantial government authorization and regulation in terms of the
decision-making, service delivery and the budget. As well, these services
would be supplied on a non-profit basis, charging consumers either no fees
or fees that are not intended to cover any or all costs. Finally, these services
will be offered under a universal service obligation (i.e., where the service
is available to all those who are resident in a specific area, without being
dependent on ability to pay or meeting other criteria), or operate under a
regulatory regime that does not permit other service suppliers to supply
services that are "like" the services offered by the governmental supplier
(in other words, they do not have the same end uses, are not comparable
in their nature and quality and they are not considered substitutes by
consumers), or if like service suppliers are allowed to participate in the

73. GATS, supranote 7 at preamble.
74. See, for example, M. Hart, GATS 2000 and Rules Governing Domestic Regulation: GATSArticle
l'1:4 in Context (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 2002) and WTO Secretariat, GATS: Fact and Fiction
(Geneva: WTO, 2001).
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market, then the governmental supplier does not compete with the private
suppliers.
III. This won't hurt a bit: the likely impact of the GA TS on medicare
Within Canada's written constitution, responsibility for health care
is shared between the federal and provincial governments. By virtue of
section 91 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, the federal government has the
ability to set national health standards. In addition, the federal government
has the responsibility to provide direct health services to specific groups,
such as veterans, Aboriginal peoples living on reserves, military personnel,
the RCMP and inmates of federal prisons. On the other hand, section 92
puts the administration and delivery of health care services for all other
citizens and legal residents within the purview of each individual province
or territory. Consequently, the federal government has laid out uniform
principles and requirements for the publicly-funded health system, but the
exact system in operation varies from province to province (and territory
to territory).
Our national system of health-care was kick-started by a 1947 decision
by Saskatchewan's government to pay for hospital services within the
province through a public insurance plan. Shortly thereafter, the federal
government sought to emulate this initiative across the country; by 1961,
all of the provinces and territories had signed agreements for federal costsharing for at least in-hospital patient care.75 The current state of Medicare
is informed by the CanadaHealth Act,76 which establishes the framework
within which Medicare operates-a universal insurance plan that provides
to all Canadians first-dollar coverage for medically necessary services
delivered by hospitals and doctors, with the twin objectives of ensuring
that Canadians are publicly insured and have timely access to medically
necessary hospital and doctor services of high quality.77 Essentially, "the
pursuit of the objective of the Canadian health care policy involves a
'contract' between Canadians and their governments-federal, provincial
and territorial" 78-that involves the payment oftaxes with the understanding
that part of these taxes will be used to fund the health-care system and thus
assure them of health-care coverage.
The CHA sets out the principles upon which the Canadian health care
system is based and the guidelines under which it should be administered,
75. Health Canada, Health CareSystem at a Glance, on-line: Health Canada <www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahcasc/media/nr-cp/2002/2002 care-soinsbk5 e.html> [HealthSystem Glance].
76. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6 [CHA].
77. Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, The Health of
Canadians-TheFederalRole. Volume Six: Recommendationsfor Reform (Ottawa: Senate of Canada,
2002) at 8 [The Kirby Report].
78. Ibid. at 8.
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ensuring that all eligible residents of Canada have reasonable access to
insured medical services79 on a prepaid basis, without direct charges at the
point of service for such services.8" The primary method through which
the federal government funds health-care is the Canada Health and Social
Transfer (CHST)-sixty-two per cent of which is notionally attributed to
health care, according to Finance Canada's estimation.8' In order to receive
the full cash contribution available through the CHST, the provinces and
territories must meet nine separate requirements, as outlined in the CHA.
There are five program criteria outlined in the CHA that serve as the
principles upon which Canadian universal health-care coverage is based:
Public administration is the overarching principle of Canada's
health system. The intent of this criterion is that the provincial
and territorial health care insurance plans be administered and
operated on a non-profit basis by a public authority, accountable
to the provincial or territorial government for decision-making
on benefit levels and services, and whose records and accounts
are publicly audited.82 While this criterion refers simply to the
funding of hospital and doctor services, the principle has been
misunderstood to concern the delivery of those services.83 In effect,
this criterion establishes an exclusive duty in each province to pay
for all insured health services delivered within the province.
* Comprehensiveness requires that provincial or territorial health
insurance plans insure all medically necessary hospital and
doctor services. As these terms are defined somewhat loosely,
provinces have some flexibility over which services they insure.
Consequently, the health services that are insured are not uniform
across provinces. Six provinces, such as Ontario and Alberta,
have legislation preventing private insurers from insuring services
insured under the CHA.84 In light of a recent Supreme Court
decision, such legislation is likely to be struck down as being
unconstitutional and thus will be of no force or effect.85 As will
79. Defined in s. 2 of the CHA as: medically necessary hospital services; medically required
physician services; and surgical-dental services required to be performed at a hospital.
80. Health Canada, Canada Health Act-Overview (Ottawa: Health Canada, 2003) at 1, online:
Health Canada <www.http//hc.sc.gc.ca/lhcs-sss/medi-assur/overview-apercu/index-e.html> [CHA
Overview].
81. The Kirby Report, supra note 77 at 291.
82. CHA Overview, supra note 80 at 3.
83. The Kirby Report, supra note 77 at 7.
84. Alberta Health Care Insurance Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-20, s. 26; Health Insurance Act, R.S.O.
1990, c. H.6, s. 14.
85. Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 2005 S.C.C. 35.
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be discussed later, though, this recent development is unlikely to
greatly affect GATS' impact on Medicare. In any case, the mere
fact that insured services are paid for by a public authority means
that private insurance companies cannot feasibly enter the market
in all provinces.
" Universality ensures that all insured residents of a province or
territory must be entitled to the insured health services provided by
the provincial or territorial health care insurance plan on uniform
terms and conditions. The CHA allows provinces or territories to
require certain residency requirements or waiting periods before a
resident can become insured, but these residency requirements or
waiting periods cannot exceed three months.
* Portability ensures that all insured residents are covered under
public health care insurance when they travel within Canada or
move from one province to another. Should the resident move
from one province to another, the original province must continue
to cover the resident during any waiting periods in the new
province. This provision covers Canadians who require services
on an urgent basis while travelling within Canada, but does not
allow residents to seek services in another province.
* Accessibility ensures that there are no financial barriers to the
provision of publicly funded health services, such as in the form
of user charges, so that needed care is available to all insured
residents regardless of their income. Further legal interpretation of
reasonable access has developed a "where and as available" rule.
As a result of this interpretation, insured residents are entitled to
have access on uniform terms and conditions to insured health
care services at the setting "where" the services are provided
and "as" the services are available in that setting.8 6 Payment
for services must be in accordance with an approved tariff set
under a provincial plan or through some other system providing
reasonable compensation to medical practitioners. Sections 12,
18 and 19 of the CHA specifically prohibit the imposition of user
fees and extra-billing for CHA insured services. Fees charged, or

86.

CHA Overview, supranote 80 at 5.
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billing, in excess of the tariff set in each province results in a
dollar for dollar reduction in federal transfers to that province.87
There is only one source of funding for health care in Canada, whether
public or private-the Canadian public.88 For those services covered by
Medicare (medically necessary doctor and hospital services), the Canadian
public pays money to the government, which then uses this money to fund
Medicare. Both the federal and provincial governments pay for insured
services under the CHA. For all other health services (pharmaceuticals,
dentistry, private long-term care, private rooms in hospitals, etc.), Canadians
either pay directly out-of-pocket for these services or have private health
insurance. In 2002, the most recent year for which statistics are available,
about 12.6 per cent of total expenditures on health were paid for by private
insurers." In 2003, foreign insurers comprised approximately eleven to
twenty-five per cent of the Canadian private insurance market. 90
While health-care in Canada is primarily financed through taxation,
this is not the sole source of funding in some provinces. In addition to
provincial and federal personal and corporate income taxes, some provinces
use ancillary funding methods-such as sales taxes, payroll levies and
lottery proceeds-that are nominally targeted for health care. Further,
three provinces (Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario) utilize health care
premiums. To keep these provincial health plans in accordance with the
CHA, the premiums charged are not rated by risk and prior payment of a
premium is not a pre-condition for receiving treatment.9 1
Within the last few years, the federal government has announced
major spending initiatives targeted at health care. Budget 1999 allocated
an additional $11.5 billion over the period from 1999-2000 to 2003-2004.
Budget 2000 and Budget 2001 saw further spending announcements
targeted at health care; finally, a new provincial-federal agreement was
reached in 2003. Most of these announcements have entailed additional
allocations of money to the provinces to target specific programs or
upgrade equipment. In 2000 and 2001, the federal government earmarked

87. CHA, ss. 14, 15 and 20. Between 1995 and 2001, approximately $6 million was withheld from
four provinces in which patients were extra-billed for insured services (C.M. Flood, "The Anatomy of
Medicare" in J. Downie, T. Caulfield & C.M. Flood, eds., CanadianHealth Law andPolicy (Toronto:
Butterworths, 2002) 1 at 30).
88. CHA Overview, supra note 80 at 9.
89. World Health Organization, WHOSIS query service, Core Health Indicators: Canada, online:
WHO <www3.who.int/whosis/country/indicators.cfm?country=can> [HealthIndicators- Canada].
90. Canadian Life and Health Insurance Information Association, CanadianLife andHealthInsurance
Facts - 2004 Edition (Toronto: Canadian Life and Health Insurance Information Association, 2004) at
25.
91. Health System Glance, supranote 75 at 4.
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nearly $600 million to establish and support health information systems,
health-related research and technology, and information technology, such
92
as electronic patient records.

At the primary care level, the vast majority of services are provided by
physicians in private practice who operate so as to make a profit from their
work. The vast majority of primary care practices are owned and managed
by the physicians themselves, with "fee-for-service (FFS) payment [a]s
the dominant form of physician remuneration." 93 Even so, twenty per cent
of physicians in 1999-2000 received some payments other than on a FFS
basis, such as a salary.94 Competency standards for physician services
are established and enforced by self-regulating organizations in each
province and territory. Some provinces have even tried to put in place
some restrictions on the number and location of physicians in the interests
of controlling costs and ensuring that individuals in all parts of a province
or territory have access to a physician.
The delivery of home care is different in every province and territory.
Delivery runs the gamut from being provided directly by government
employees in Saskatchewan and Manitoba to being supplied by for-profit
and not-for-profit agencies that win the contracts through competitive
tenders in Ontario (for most home-care services) and Alberta (for nonprofessional home-care services). On the other hand, home-care services
in Quebec are provided in a partnership between the government and notfor-profit private providers. At least seven provinces provide funding,
either directly or through service vouchers, to eligible disabled adults to
hire their own home-care providers.95
At the secondary level of care, most Canadian hospitals are not-forprofit entities incorporated under provincial or territorial legislation, but
fully five per cent of Canadian hospitals are private for-profit institutions.96
Most Canadian hospitals, whether for-profit or not-for-profit, are not
governmental institutions. Their letters patent or articles of incorporation
set out their objectives and establish whether or not they are profitseeking.

92. Ibid. at 5.
93. The Kirby Report, supra note 77 at 77.
94. Canadian Institute for Health Information, Canadas Health CareProviders(Ottawa: CLIHI, 2002)
at 74, online: CIHI <www.cihi.ca> [Canadas Health Care Providers]. The proportion of physicians
receiving payments other than on a FFS basis varies from 2% in Alberta to 40% in Manitoba (CIHI,
Health Care in Canada2002 (Ottawa: CIHI, 2002) at 33, online: CIHI <www.cihi.ca>).
95. Romanow Report, supra note 6 at 173-175; Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives,
"Globalization and Health: Implications and Options for Health Care Reform: Report prepared by the
CCPA Consortium on Globalization and Health for the Commission on the Future of Health Care in
Canada" (Ottawa: CCPA, 2002) at 28 [CCPA Report on Health].
96. The Kirby Report, supra note 77 at 25.

How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the GATS
Each province and territory has framework legislation in place for
hospitals97 and the government is extensively involved in their operation.9"
All hospitals, not-for-profit and for-profit, must be licensed to operate and
may be ordered by the responsible minister to offer or to cease offering
specific services or even to cease operations altogether. Typically, any
change to their operations or facilities must be approved by the responsible
minister.
Provincial governments directly finance the operations of Canadian
hospitals (sometimes through a designated regional agency). The method
through which hospital budgets are calculated from year to year varies
from province to province. Line-by-line budgeting used to be the most
popular method of hospital financing in Canada, but only two provinces
(British Columbia and New Brunswick) currently use this approach as their
primary means of hospital financing. Presently, a ministerial discretion
method of financing99 is the most often used primary source of hospital
funding, with population-based funding and global budgets being the other
primary methods utilized.100 In some provinces, hospitals must raise some
funds for capital expenditures from their communities.' 0 '
Traditionally, volunteer boards of directors have run hospitals with
community and, sometimes, staff representatives. Recently, in all provinces
save Ontario, many of the administrative responsibilities of hospitals have
been transferred to regional health authorities that administer a number of
1' Most regional health authorities are appointed by government,
hospitals. 02
though there have been recent initiatives in some provinces to allow some
boards to be elected by the public.
Most of the health-care professionals who work in these hospitals, or
in other private businesses operating on a for-profit or not-for-profit basis,
are salaried employees. For example, most nurses are salaried employees,
with approximately sixty-four per cent of them working in hospitals. 03
Still other health-care professionals are self-employed. Likely all of these
businesses and practitioners seek to service the same pool of people,
with more patients for one meaning less-and likely less money-for
others (assuming a finite market). At the very least, the for-profit private
97. For example, Ontario's Public HospitalsAct, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.40; Nova Scotia's HospitalsAct,
R.S.N.S. 1989, c, 208; and British Columbia's HospitalAct, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 200.
98. Flood, supranote 87 at 40 states that provincial governments are so heavily involved in Canadian
hospitals that they "look and act like government owned hospitals."
99. In this method of financing, funding is based on decisions made by the provincial minister of
health in response to specific requests by the hospital concerned.
100. The Kirby Report, supra note 77 at 27-33.
101. Deber, supra note 15 at 30.
102. For example, Alberta's Regional HealthAuthorities Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. R- 10, s. 2.
103. Flood, supra note 87 at 39.
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businesses and self-employed professionals can be characterized in this
way.
All health-care professionals are subject to some form of regulation.
Some categories of health-care professionals, such as nurses, are
regulated in all provinces and territories. Other categories of healthcare professionals are only regulated in some provinces, such as massage
therapists in B.C. 10 4 Health-care professionals require either a license to
practice their profession or a certificate to allow them to use a particular
title. Obtaining and keeping a license depends on the professional meeting
certain ethical and professional standards, while certificates can only be
obtained if an individual meets certain requirements. Provincial and
territorial requirements as to which professionals require licenses and/or
certificates and the standards they must meet vary. Professional standards
for many professionals are set by self-regulating organizations. 105
Finally, there are nursing homes and homes for the aged, which
offer a mix of services that includes health services supplied by health
professionals. Most nursing homes in Canada are run by large firms
10 6
seeking to maximize their returns and are subject to a licensing regime,
while the responsible provincial ministry sets standards for admission, care
and facilities. Homes for the aged, on the other hand, may be run by forprofit private businesses, by non-profit corporations or by municipalities.
Some provinces have licensing requirements for homes for the aged, but
10 7
this is not the case in all provinces.
Private health services entail all those health services supplementary to
medically necessary hospital and doctor services (i.e., dental care, optometry
and prescription drugs). Such services must be privately financed. In
2002, private expenditures on health accounted for 30.1 per cent of total
expenditure on health, with pre-paid insurance plans accounting for 42.1 per
cent of these private expenditures on health."0 8 There are some provincial
programs to cover some of the medically-related expenses incurred by
individuals. However, financial assistance is restricted under most of these
programs to particular groups, such as seniors, the disabled and welfare

104. Canada's Health Care Providers, supra note 94 at 23.
105. L. McNamara, E. Nelson and B. Windwick, "Regulation of Health Care Professionals" in J.
Downie, T. Caulfield & C.M. Flood, eds., Canadian Health Law and Policy (Toronto: Butterworths,
2002) 55 at 60-80.
106. For example, Ontario's Nursing Homes Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. N.7; British Columbia's Hospital
Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 200; and Alberta's Nursing Homes Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. N.7.
107. For example, neither Ontario nor Nova Scotia require licenses, while British Columbia
has extensive regulation (see Community Care Facility Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 60 and Adult Care
Regulations, B.C. Reg. 536/80).
108. Health Indicators- Canada,supranote 89.
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recipients. 0 9 These provincial supplementary benefits programs fund the
same services as are covered by private insurers, thus offering duplicative
coverage in the supplementary benefits market."'
1. Application of the governmental authority exclusion"'
Thorough consideration of the impact of the definitions found in the Annex
on Financial Services on Medicare is beyond this article's scope. Even so,
these definitions should not affect the paper's conclusion. First, Medicare
should not be considered as an insurance service. While Medicare is often
described as an insurance scheme, this phrasing is more accurately seen as
a metaphorical tool used to help the public comprehend the nature of the
program, rather than as a definitional or descriptive phrase. Unlike other
insurance schemes, coverage is based on residency, not one's risk factors;
further, payments by citizens are based on their level of earning (through
the various tax brackets), rather than based on health risk factors." 2
Second, as discussed above, the definitions in the Annex on Financial
Services have no bearing on the delivery of health services. Potentially,
the funding mechanisms for Medicare could be considered as affecting
the supply of financial services, thus bringing it within the scope of the
Annex. Even if this were to be the case, the service of providing the
funds for health services provided within the health-care system will be
excluded from GATS' scope regardless of which set of definitions for the
Governmental Authority Exclusion are employed.
a. Medicare (its overall architecture)
Medicare should not be subject to the GATS." 3 According to the criteria
established in GATS Article 1.3, Medicare is not provided on a commercial
basis or in competition with one or more service suppliers. As stated
109. Health System Glance, supra note 75, at 3.
110. Flood, supra note 87 at 33.
I1l. It should be stressed that the findings of this paper are not necessarily applicable to all public
service regimes in all countries, or even to all national health-care systems. Analysis should be done
on a case-by-case basis due to the divergent service structures across countries and the varying GATS
commitments each country has made in their schedules. To determine whether a given public service
comes within the Governmental Authority Exclusion, each should be investigated and evaluated
separately.
112. VanDuzer, supra note 30 at 399-401, the only commentator to extensively explore this issue,
concurs with this assessment.
113. The conclusion that provincial health insurance plans, as they currently operate, are excluded
from the application of GATS under Article 1.3(b) is shared by J.R. Johnson, How Will International
TradeAgreements Affect CanadianHealth CareDiscussion PaperNo. 22 (Ottawa: Commission on the
Future of Health Care in Canada, 2002) at 18; Sanger, supra note 7 at 76-81 (with some reservations)
and CCPA Report on Health, supra note 95. The conclusion that the Medicare system is excluded
from the application of the GATS under the definitions contained in the Annex on Financial Services
is advanced by VanDuzer, supra note 30 at 408-410. The Romanow Report, supra note 6 at 237,
concludes that there is a 'strong consensus' that the existing system cannot be challenged.
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above, Medicare operates under a statutory regime created by the Canada
Health Act and is administered publicly through provincial programs and
agencies. The system is operated on a non-commercial basis because
there is no intention to profit or recover costs from consumers. User fees
are only levied in two provinces. Where user fees are charged, they are
meant to prevent abuse of the system rather than to produce profits; further,
payment is not a condition of treatment.
Finally, Medicare does not compete with private suppliers. There are
private suppliers of health insurance in Canada, but they primarily fund
services that are not covered by the CanadaHealth Act." 4 This state of
affairs could change, though, in light of the recent Supreme Court decision
in Chaoulliv. Quebec." 5 In this decision, the Court ruled 4-3 that legislating
a ban on allowing private insurance to pay for health services covered
under the provincial plan violated Quebec's Charterof Rights. However,
the Court split 3-3 on whether such a policy violates the CanadianCharter
of Rights and Freedoms, so there is no immediate impact on the Canadian
health-care system as a whole. Consequently, there is a strong possibility
that provinces, such as Ontario, that currently have legislation in place
banning private insurance from paying for services covered under the
provincial health-care plan will have to lift these bans.
Even with such a development, it would be difficult to say that Medicare
is in competition with one or more of the private insurance suppliers.
First, the Supreme Court's decision will not lead to the development of
a private health market in Canada, as one which was not in competition
with Medicare already existed well before the decision. There are private
clinics that offer services that are scarce in the public system, such as
MRI scans, to those who can afford the service, those patients covered by
employer-funded workers' compensation plans," 6 as well as the police and
the army (when they are seeking speedier treatment)."' In fact, almost a
third of the $130 billion spent on health in Canada last year was paid for
out of private pockets." 8
Second, there are other impediments in place to private health insurance
being a true competitor to Medicare. Private medical insurance is limited
even in the four provinces that lacked a Quebec-style ban on private health
114. While this assessment is being challenged in certain quarters, the vast majority of opinion
supports that the overall architecture of Medicare satisfies the tests articulated in the Governmental
Authority Exclusion.
115. Supra note 85.
116. Private concerns, supra note 2 at 51.
117. Fistfuls of Health Dollars, supra note 3 at 45.
118. Private Concems, supra note 2 at 51. While this figure is indicative of the presence of a private
health services market, it overstates the matter, since it likely includes private payment for services,
such as prescription drugs and home care, that are not covered under Medicare in the first place.
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insurance." 9 As such, it seems unlikely that the Chaoullidecision will lead
to rampant private insurance in the other six provinces. Further, Ontario,
for example, bans doctors from charging private patients more than the
publicly funded fee for the same service. Such a ban should be protected
by the horizontal commitment in Canada's GATS schedule discussed
earlier whereby measures related to the supply of services required to be
offered to the public generally in the health sector may result in differential
treatment in terms of price. Ontario's price limitation on private services
lessens the appeal of private medicine for practitioners, 20 which will act as
a limitation on the availability of supply of private health services.
Private health services are also unlikely to compete with Medicare
because they will not be able to offer the same scope of services. While
primary level care, as well as diagnostics and testing, are available
privately, private services at the secondary level of care are almost nonexistent. Further, the provincial government decides whether hospitals,
both public and private, can operate within their jurisdiction. Thus,
government can regulate the extent to which private secondary health
services are available.
Finally, private health insurance, even if allowed unfettered throughout
Canada, does not compete with Medicare since all Canadians must subscribe
to Medicare and are entitled to treatment within that system by virtue of
their residency (since it is a universal service obligation). Even those who
choose to obtain private health insurance are unlikely completely to forego
treatment in the public system; instead, they will likely use the private
system when the same quality of services cannot be obtained in the same
amount of time, which reflects that Medicare and private health insurance
are likely to be complements rather than substitutes.
b. Hospitals
Hospital services appear to be excluded from the scope of the GATS since
they fulfill all of the Governmental Authority Exclusion's requirements.
Hospitals are subject to state-set pricing; their management is accountable
to government; their budgets require government approval and government
may determine what services they offer.' 2' Inmost provinces, administrative
responsibilities of hospitals are being transferred to government-run
regional health authorities. Hospitals are under so much government
control that one commentator has concluded that they "look and act like

119. Ibid. at51.
120. Ibid. at 51.
121. See, for example, Public HospitalsAct, R.S.O. 1990, c.P.40 and HospitalAct, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.
200.
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government owned hospitals"1 22; even the Supreme Court of Canada has
found that their actions are "governmental" in nature for the purposes of
23
the CharterofRights andFreedoms.
On balance, hospitals cannot be considered to operate on a commercial
basis. 124 Almost all hospitals are non-profit institutions and they do not sell
their services to patients. Billings to provincial health plans for services
by staff and use of facilities are at prices fixed under provincial tariffs
that are only meant to cover expenses, not to create profits. 125 Most other
expenses are funded by the provinces on the basis of budgets approved by
provincial authorities. On the other hand, those hospitals that operate on
a for-profit basis would be operating on a commercial basis and thus be
subject to GATS' provisions.
Public hospitals do compete with one another for budgets and
power. An example of this form of competition would be the recent
dispute between the Hospital for Sick Children in Toronto (Sick Kids)
and the Children's Hospital of Eastern Ontario in Ottawa (CHEO) for the
exclusive right to provide children's cardiac surgery. Despite the presence
of such competition, public hospitals likely are not seen as substitutes
by the public and thus do not fulfill the competition requirements from a
consumer's perspective. While Sick Kids and CHEO fought for the ability
to provide a particular service, only one hospital will perform children's
cardiac surgery. So, even for young patients seeking cardiac surgery in
Ontario, these two hospitals are not competitors.
Supplementary hospital services beyond those insured under the
Canada Health Act for which the patient pays directly, such as private
rooms, would not fall under the Governmental Authority Exclusion.
Many of these services are offered at prices that are intended to recover,
at a minimum, all costs associated with the service; hospitals often seek
to generate a surplus from such services. Such services would be offered
on a commercial basis and thus not within the Governmental Authority
Exclusion.
The above analysis pertains to public hospitals. The situation with
respect to private hospitals, such as Toronto's Shouldice Clinic for hernia
operations, would be different. It is difficult fully to assess if competition
will be found between these private hospitals and public hospitals. The
one-way conception of competition offered earlier would seem to protect
122. Flood, supra note 87, at 40.
123. Eldridgev. British Columbia, [1997] 151 D.L.R. ( 4 a' ) 577 (S.C.C.).
124. Sanger, supra note 8 at 93.
125. Since such billings are meant to cover expenses, there is still a possibility that public, not-forprofit hospitals will be considered to operate on a commercial basis and will thus be subject to the
GATS' provisions.
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public hospitals, as public hospitals do not compete with private hospitals
in that they are not servicing the same market. It has been suggested that
public and private hospitals may offer quite different services, such as the
absence of waiting lists, newer equipment and the presence of fees, such that
no competition could be found between them. However, this assessment
is not certain, since public and private hospitals are functionally the same
even if they are not complete substitutes. Overall, if private hospitals were
allowed to provide insured services, then competition would definitely
exist. 126
c. Physicians
Physicians providing services insured under the Canada Health Act,
whether inside or outside of hospitals, tend to be for-profit suppliers
and thus are not subject to the Governmental Authority Exclusion. The
state plays a significant role in the licensing of physicians and regulating
standards within the industry, as well as fixing the prices charged for
their services and setting a ceiling for their remuneration. Despite this,
physicians (particularly those in private practice) can be seen as independent
operators who can choose who they treat, what treatment they provide and
when they provide it. Thus, they likely will not be seen as governmental
in nature. Beyond that, physician services are provided on a commercial
basis, as they operate for profit. Physicians earn their living from the
provision of these services. So, even if the government sets the fees for
such services, the doctors are still seeking to maximize their returns and
are operating on a for-profit basis and, thus, on a commercial basis. As
well, since remuneration depends on the amount of services provided,
physicians tend to compete with each other for patients. Further, patients
can and do switch between physicians. To a consumer seeking medical
treatment, one physician is substitutable for another, offering services of
a similar nature and/or quality. This would make physicians operate in
competition with one or more service suppliers.
d. Health-careprofessionals
A similar conclusion can be reached for all health-related services provided
by health professionals that are not insured under the CanadaHealth Act,
such as physiotherapists, chiropractors and naturalists. Although many
of these professions are subject to some regulation to ensure standards of
competence, this is not sufficient regulation to make them governmental
in nature. As well, delivery is done by private, for-profit service suppliers

126. VanDuzer, supra note 30 at 410, 412-413.
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operating on a commercial basis in competition with each other for the
same reasons as were noted for physicians.
e. Home Care
Home care is offered in different ways in different provinces. Where
home-care services are supplied directly by the state without charge, as is
the case in Saskatchewan and Manitoba and in Alberta and Quebec (in the
case of professional services), these services may be found to be within
the Governmental Authority Exclusion. The funding of such services is
not done on a commercial basis, as the government does not seek to profit
from its funding of these services. If either there are no private home care
providers or if the government service supplier has no mandate to compete
with private home-care suppliers, then there is no competition with one or
more service suppliers.
Delivery ofthese services, though, is likely not within the Governmental
Authority Exclusion. Those providing home-care services, although
funded by the government, operate similarly to the health professionals
described above. The companies and/or individuals earn their living from
the provision of these services and seek to maximize their returns. Further,
from the perspective of the province (the consumer in this instance), the
health service professionals providing these home-care services provide
like services and can be substituted one for the other. Thus, these service
providers are in competition with one another. Particularly in those
provinces, like Ontario, where most home care is delivered by private
non-profit and for-profit suppliers, the service providers are operating on a
commercial basis in competition with one or more service suppliers.
f. Nursing homes andhomes for the aged
Nursing homes and other long-term care facilities supplied by private forprofit service providers are subject to GATS' provisions. Like the health
professionals above, government regulation and licensing requirements
try to ensure certain standards. However, in any case, these facilities
operate on a commercial basis, as the fees they charge seek to more than
cover their operating costs, and they compete with each other, as they
likely provide the same end use and are substitutable from the consumer's
perspective.
g. Supplementary health services
As discussed earlier, the specific services funded in each provincial health
insurance plan vary. Some provinces fully fund a number of health services
that are outside the definition of those that must be insured under the
CanadaHealth Act. Assuming that these services do not directly compete
with private suppliers and that user fees seeking to recover the cost of
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the service are not charged, the funding of these services would also be
excluded from GATS' scope. Thus, the funding of health services that
fall within GATS' scope can vary from province to province. However,
the delivery of these services, like the delivery of most services that
must be insured under the Canada Health Act, would not be within the
Governmental Authority Exclusion.
Government programs funding health services that are not insured
under the CanadaHealth Act, but are funded by the government in certain
circumstances (such as funding prescriptions for the elderly, funding of
medical equipment and devices for the disabled) are likely to fall within
the Governmental Authority Exclusion. These services are funded by
the government directly. The programs typically have small fees that do
not reflect the actual cost of the service, although government coverage
does not kick in, in some instances, until a specific monetary threshold
is surpassed. So it seems these services are not offered on a commercial
basis. Finally, in this specific area, government is not competing with
private insurance providers, as these programs have been set up specifically
by the government to fund those who would likely not be insured by a
private provider, such as those at high risk or those on welfare who cannot
afford private insurance. The target market of these programs precludes
competition with private providers. So the ability of the government to
fund such programs is outside the scope of GATS' provisions. However,
the delivery of these programs is subject to GATS. The services such
programs provide are similar in nature or quality and have the same end
use as those offered by private insurers and most consumers would see
these services as substitutable. Thus, they are likely in competition with
one another.
2. The effect of GATS'universal obligations
The elements of Medicare that are not within the Governmental Authority
Exclusion are subject to the GATS universal obligations. Of these
obligations, only MFN and the rules on monopolies are likely to have any
impact. 127 Even so, these obligations are likely to have minimal effect and,

127. The other three main universal obligations (transparency, judicial review, and recognition) were
arguably all satisfied in Canada for many years before GATS came into force. There is no reason to
believe that having to publish any rules relating to GPs, for instance, or allowing access to Canadian
courts for foreign corporations desiring to open a hospital that feel they have been mistreated will have
any impact on the continued public nature of Medicare.
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in any case, are of limited liberalizing impact.1 28 Even laws in the future
will likely not be greatly affected by the MFN obligation. However, in
the event of greater foreign participation in Medicare, the MFN obligation
would become more significant.
The current level of foreign participation in the Canadian health care
system is likely quite low. 29 While it remains low, MFN will be a minor
concern; MFN's importance will grow as more foreign service providers
are allowed to operate in Canada. Even so, the MFN requirement and
its effect should be taken into consideration by Canadian policymakers
that choose to allow foreign providers to operate in Canada, although it
would appear such allowances could be retracted in the future with little
impediment.
As greater foreign participation is allowed in Medicare, MFN will
have a greater impact, but greater foreign participation is not an inevitable
result of complying with MFN. Nothing in GATS' MFN obligation forces
Canada to open its health market to foreign service providers; it simply
requires that Canada not discriminate between service providers from
other countries should Canada allow foreign service providers to operate
in its market.
Further, complying with MFN does not necessarily enshrine foreign
access to the Canadian market. Nothing in the GATS, resulting from the
MFN obligation, prevents Canada from retracting market openings, for
example in the health services sector.
One note of caution regarding MFN should be sounded, though. As
discussed earlier, it is unclear which services will be found to be "like"
and what the MFN obligation will require if they are.13 This uncertainty
makes it difficult to predict precisely when discriminatory measures will
be MFN-consistent and when they will not be.
Next, there are the provisions regarding monopolies and exclusive
service suppliers. The most obvious monopolies are the provincial health
insurance schemes. Since these are within the Governmental Authority
Exclusion, they are not required to abide by GATS Article VIII. However,

128. Most commentators seem to agree that MFN obligations will not lead to the privatization of
health services. Johnson, supra note 113 at 19 states that the MFN obligation will have a "minimal
effect on Canada's health care system." Further, Krajewski, Luff and VanDuzer feel that the MFN
obligation, in general, will not have a significant impact in relation to public services (Krajewski 2003,
supra note 37 at 359; Luff, supra note 37 at 193 and VanDuzer, supra note 30 at 437-438). Even
some GATS critics acknowledge the GATS obligation leaves Canada a "considerable degree of policy
flexibility" (Sinclair & Grieshaber-Otto, supra note 8 at 104). Other critics, though, have come to a
different conclusion (see, for example, Sanger, supra note 8).
129. The precise level is unclear, mainly due to a lack of resources on the subject. For a similar
assessment, see VanDuzer, above note 30 at 437.
130. See notes 62-67 above and ibid. at 451-454.
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even if these programs were to be subject to this provision, it would not pose
a great obstacle. The GATS does not outlaw the existence of monopolies,
so provincial health care programs with monopoly powers are not GATSinconsistent. The monopolies must observe the MFN commitment and not
undermine scheduled commitments. Observing the MFN requirement, as
discussed, is not onerous and does not mandate liberalization.
Some commentators contend that provincial monopolies on health
insurance programs thus undermine Canada's commitments. As already
discussed, the Medicare system, while often called an insurance scheme, is
not truly a system of health insurance. Beyond that, there is nothing in the
GATS that would prevent Canada from limiting the areas in which private
health insurance can operate, such that the provincial monopolies do not
undermine the scheduled commitment. However, should the provincial
plans choose to expand what is covered by public funding, thus excluding
private insurers from providing these services, there is a possibility that
this could be seen as a violation of Canada's market access commitments
in health insurance.
3. The impact of commitments in Canada' schedule
As discussed earlier, Canada's "belt and suspenders" approach means that
there are negligible commitments scheduled with respect to its health care.
There are a few commitments made with respect to services that Canada's
health services purchase, but these will likely not have any impact on
Canada's health services other than possible efficiency gains by health
service providers due to lower costs for these services resulting from
greater (and possibly foreign) competition.
The listing of health insurance in Canada's GATS schedule has
already been discussed. In all likelihood, Canada's commitment will
be seen to pertain solely to private health insurance-meaning that this
commitment does not include Medicare. Even if the health services
available through private health insurance begin to resemble more closely
the services offered under Medicare as a result of the Chaoulli decision,
Canada's commitment with regard to health insurance poses no restriction
to Canadian governments choosing to continue to fund a public universal
health-care system. The most the commitment could mean in this respect
is that more private health services would have to be allowed access to
the Canadian market. It is unlikely that this greater access would lead
to competition between the public and private systems, rather than these
being complements for one another, as discussed earlier.
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4. The effect of Canada' horizontal commitments
Due to the fact that Canada has made so few commitments with respect
to its health services, Canada's horizontal commitments do not play a
large role. Canada has a horizontal commitment with respect to mode 3
in national treatment only, one that retains Canada's freedom to engage in
"the supply of a service or its subsidization within the public sector." Since
this horizontal commitment pertains to national treatment, it would allow
Canada to favour health insurance provided by Canadian suppliers (such
as, say, provincial health insurance schemes) compared to health insurance
provided privately by foreign service suppliers since the private providers
would not be within the public sector. Further, the limitation means that
Canada does not have to maintain the same conditions of competition for
Canadian and foreign service providers. The horizontal commitment does
not pertain to market access, so Canada could not prevent foreign health
insurers from establishing themselves in the Canadian market. However,
the national treatment limitation means that the foreign service providers'
establishment in Canada does not assure them a right to insure services
provided under the CHA.
5. The ability to regulate
Governments have the ability to regulate health care and public health
regardless of whether or not various public services fall within the
Governmental Authority Exclusion. Nothing within the GATS prevents
governments from regulating and enforcing standards for competence
and other aspects of quality in the delivery of health services, controlling
who can provide health services within its borders, or assigning bodies
to supervise the medical profession. For example, there is nothing in
the GATS that will prevent the Ontario government from maintaining
laws stipulating that no one can operate a hospital and provide medical
services therein within its jurisdiction without receiving permission from
the Minister of Health to do so. Where this regulatory capacity comes
into question is when it is applied against foreign service suppliers in a
discriminatory fashion that breaches MFN or national treatment or market
access, such as if the Ontario government were to legislate that only
hospitals owned by foreign entities would have to re-apply every three
years for permission to operate. GATS Article VI does set some standards
for domestic regulation, but the substantive obligations only apply to those
sectors listed in a Member's schedule of commitments. Also, Canada can
still determine which foreign qualifications it will recognize as satisfying
domestic qualification requirements, so long as these do not become
disguised restrictions on trade.
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6. The ability to insure/fundpublicly
Neither the universal obligations nor Canada's listing of health insurance in
its schedule of commitments threatens Canada's ability to pay, from public
funds, for all medically necessary services within Canada, regardless of
the nationality of the service provider that provides them.
7. The ability to provide publicly
As Canada has made no commitments with respect to hospital services,
there is nothing in the GATS that would require Canada to allow a foreignowned hospital to commence operations in Canada. As such, should
Canada choose to continue funding medically necessary hospital services
through hospitals that are quasi-public entities, that is its prerogative. The
GATS will neither force the entry of foreign service suppliers, nor the
privatization of currently public health service providers.
As for physicians and other health professionals, they will continue
to be private operators. These categories of health service providers were
private before the enactment of the GATS and have continued to be private
since the GATS came into force. Their private operations have nothing to
do with the GATS and their public or private status will not change as a
consequence of the GATS.
Conclusion
As shown in the preceding analysis, the controversy surrounding GATS'
impact on national universal health-care systems, at least in Canada,
appears unfounded. Given the likely interpretation a WTO Panel will
adopt for the Governmental Authority Exclusion in GATS Article 1.3,
there appears to be no threat to the public administration, financing and
regulation of Medicare.
This article has shown that, for a measure relating to a service to be
within the Governmental Authority Exclusion, it must be: 1) not supplied
on a commercial basis; and 2) not supplied in competition with one or
more service suppliers. Applying these criteria to Medicare yields the
result that the basic architecture of Medicare (essentially the provincial
health insurance schemes and their public administration), along with the
funding of many supplementary services, home care and hospital services in
Canada satisfy the requirements of the Governmental Authority Exclusion
and are thus excluded from the GATS; the GATS does not pose a threat to
the integrity of the Canadian health-care system.
While it has been found that the GATS likely pertains to the delivery
of certain elements of Medicare, the public nature and government backing
of this system is assured. GATS' likely impact seems fairly minimal
and does not jeopardize the universal coverage available to residents in
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Canada. In total, the possibility remains that health services could be
provided by domestic or foreign service suppliers. However, regardless
of the nationality of the service provider, the GATS poses no threat to
keeping the federal and provincial governments as the entities funding
the provision of these services. Accordingly, egalitarian access to health
services should be preserved.
A few caveats should be made at this time. First, the analysis in this
paper is highly speculative, given the unknown nature of how a WTO Panel
will approach this issue. While the analysis has tried to stay true to the
WTO adjudication procedure, there is no guarantee that its results would
be vindicated should such a dispute ever arise. Second, the description
of Medicare is, by necessity, a broad generalization. Given the scope and
length of this article, an in-depth analysis that accurately portrays every
minute detail of Medicare is not feasible. The description provided,
however, does accurately capture the general nature of the system and how
it operates. Lastly, this paper is not necessarily an exhaustive exploration
of this question. Some tangential issues-such as the treatment of
subsidies and the effect of Canada being a signatory to the plurilateral
Agreement on Government Procurement-have not been discussed due
to space constraints. Further, the GATS 2000 negotiations are on-going
as part of the Doha Round, and it is possible that these negotiations could
produce results affecting the applicability of this paper's analysis.
So, Canadians can continue to value, and take pride in, our national
health-care system. The success of Medicare demonstrates that equality
of access to, and distribution of, health services is a noble goal that is not
only desirable, but also attainable. A mix of public and private supply of
health services has been employed to achieve the current universal level
of health coverage in Canada. As shown by this article's conclusions,
even in the face of the GATS, a similar mix of public and private delivery
will continue to ensure that health coverage is universal. Despite the dire
predictions, Medicare appears secure. As such, it is time for Canadians to
stop worrying and learn to love the GATS.

